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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
FAILING TO ASSIGN CONTRACTUALLY DUE ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS TO DEFENDANT.
Utah law is well-settled that when an attorney feb provision is provided by

contract, attorney fees are awarded as a matter of right pursuant to the contract.
Foster v. Montgomery, 2003 UT App. 405, 12, 82 p.3d 191. Appellant 14
Solutions cites Utah's Reciprocity Statute in its initial brief, Utah Code § 78B-5826, in support of its appeal. This statute was relied on by Respondent when
requesting attorney fees after trial.
required.

[R294 162:8-20]

Respondent represented then they were

After losing the case, Respondent is now

disingenuously making the opposite representation to the Appellate Court: that
attorney fees are not required. As Respondent points out, although the Reciprocity
I
Statute does use the word "may," that word is not always permissive but is a word
of mandate in an appropriate context. Myles v. State of Florida, 602 So.2d 1278,
1281 (Fla. 1992). To determine what the meaning of the word "may" denotes, it
l

must always be evaluated within its context and subject matter. Olympic
Construction, Inc. v. Drywall Interiors, Inc., 348 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. App. 1986).
See also Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. BillHarbert Construction Co., 120 S. Ct. 1331,
1336 (2000). 14 Solutions submits that the Reciprocity Statite was not intended to

change long-settled Utah law to make contractual attorney fees awards permissive
in the discretion of District courts.
II.

14 SOLUTIONS IS THE PREVAILING PARTY UNDER ALL
LEGAL THEORIES.
The Utah Supreme Court has instructed District courts to apply common

sense principles in determining the prevailing party, when awarding attorney fees,
under statute allowing a court to award attorney fees and costs to prevailing party
in any action based upon a written contract if the contract allows at least one party
to recover attorney fees. J. Pochynock Co. v. Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, ff 9, 12, 116
P.3d 353.
Robertson is desperate to cloud the simple fact that under any legal theory
applied to facts and ruling, 14 Solutions was the prevailing party. In Robertson's
"Issue Presented" section, Robertson claims that the trial court ruled that neither
party prevailed. Robertson then goes on to argue for a standard of review that
presumes such a ruling was made when it was not. Robertson then contradicts
itself in subparagraph (b) by asking the Court review whether it was proper for 14
Solutions to have been declared "the prevailing party" by the trial court. Finally,
in Robertson's "Statement of Facts" section, Robertson contradicts itself a third
time on the issue of the prevailing party, claiming that the trial court "declined to
5

find that either party prevailed."
The Utah Supreme Court in Pochynock states the standard in Utah for
1
determining who was the prevailing party is a "flexible and reasonable standard."
Id. at f 11. As brought up in Robertson's opposition brief, the Utah Supreme Court
expressly declined to adopt the net judgment rule, which is a rule directing that the
party who recovers the largest net judgment is the prevailing party. The Supreme
Court explained that the "flexible and reasoned approabh requires . . . looking at
I

the amounts actually sought and then balancing them proportionally with what was
recovered." Id. at 112.
The rules for determining which party is the prevailing party under the
flexible and reasonable approach are set forth in Mountain States Broadcasting Co.
v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 556-57 (Utah Ct.App.1989). According to Mountain
I

States, District courts should first consider which party received the net judgment
(which is 14 Solutions in this case). The District courts should then consider
I

additional factors relevant to determining which party had the "comparative
I
victory." 14 Solutions defeated Robertson's claim to pave its down-payment
returned and won additional damages in a case 14 Solutions did not initiate. 14
Solutions had the comparative victory. In the present controversy, 14 Solutions is
the prevailing party under both the net judgment rule and the flexible and reasoned
6

approach, as well as the other theories previously discussed in its initial brief.
In some Utah cases, such as A.K & R. Whipple Pluming & Heating v. Aspen
Constr., 2004 UT 47, f 7, 94 P.3d 270, net recoveries of 2% of the claimed
damages by plaintiffs have been found to be insufficient in light of other factors to
recover claimed damages under the flexible and reasoned approach despite being
sufficient under the net judgment rule; however, in the present controversy, 14
Solutions recovered 51.4% of its claimed damages as a defendant, and keep
Plaintiffs awarded damages to 0%. As the Defendant, 14 Solutions was forced to
bring its damage claims by Rule 13(a) of The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(URCP) to defend against what turned out to be entirely meritlessCauses of action
by Robertson. The Plaintiff, Robertson, failed to recover any portion of the downpayment it was seeking to have returned. The trial court allowed 14 Solutions to
retain that $3,500 down-payment under the contract, and awarded 14 Solutions
additional moneys.
A*

Even if 14 Solutions Had Recovered Nothing, 14 Solutions Would
Still Be the Prevailing Party Under Utah Law.

Furthermore, it is well-settled that even if 14 Solutions had recovered
nothing in the present case, 14 Solutions would still be the prevailing party
pursuant to the relevant contract. Mountain States holds at 555 (emphasis added):

7

Typically, determining the 'prevailing party for purposes of awarding
fees and costs is quit simple. Plaintiff sues defendant for money
damages; if plaintiff is awarded a judgment, plaintiff has prevailed,
and if defendant successfully defends and avoids an adverse
judgment, defendant has prevailed.
For this reason, it may not even be necessary for the Court to analyze the
effect of 14 Solution's unjust enrichment victory against Robertson, for even in the
absence of 14 Solutions' unjust enrichment victory, 14 Solutions is still the
prevailing party under the contract. For this reason, al} of Roberson's arguments
about whether or not the trial court found that Robertson breached the contract are
irrelevant, as the only relevant fact may be that the trial court's refusal to award
any damages to Plaintiff on its breach of contract action.
ALL OF ROBERTSON'S ARGUMENTS i UN \iTf> \i
FLAWED.

\i<l

Robertson makes four basic arguments on appeal. First, Robertson argues

I

that 14 Solutions should have presented arguments about which party prevailed,
i

I
and should have presented arguments that Robertson "did not" breach the contract.
I
There appears to be a typographical error in Robertson's first argument. 14
Solutions presumes Robertson meant to submit that 14 Solutions should have
argued that Robertson "did" breach the contract. Presuming thai Robertson meant
the latter, Robertson's first argument presumes incorrectly that the trial court

8

determined that neither party prevailed, and that the trial court determined that
Robertson did not breach the contract. The trial court's ruling determined neither
of these issues, and 14 Solutions has presented arguments that it was the prevailing
party and Robertson was found to have breached the contract by the plain language
of the trial court's findings of fact.
Robertson goes on, in its first argument, to assert that 14 Solutions is
challenging the trial court's finding of fact, and that the abuse of discretion
standard is the appropriate standard of review, which 14 Solutions has failed to
support.

Robertson fails to understand that 14 Solutions is challenging the

conclusions of law, and not the findings of fact.
A.

This Court Should Recognize the Legal Consequence of the Trial
Court's Factual Determinations: That 14 Solutions Won its
Breach of Contract Claim.

Robertson erroneously argues that 14 Solutions is seeking to have the trial
court's finding of fact overturned. Such is not the case. The trial court's findings
of facts support the legal conclusion that 14 Solutions prevailed on its breach on
contract claim because each of the factual elements necessary to support a breach
of contract victory are met in the findings of fact. Hence, the issue for this Court is
not whether the findings of fact were abusive or clearly erroneous, but what the
elements of the breach of contract cause of action in Utah are. This is an issue of
Q

law that should be reviewed for correctness.

Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,

f|23-25, 112 P.3d 495 (designating a clearly erroneous standard for fact review
and correctness standard for review of legal conclusions in an equitable
distribution proceeding); RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, <I35, 96 P.3d 935
(applying these standards to all cases in equity).
The breach of contract analysis is a potentially necessary issue, properly
raised in the initial brief and reviewed for correctness, to determining the ultimate
issues on appeal: whether attorney fees should have been awarded to 14 Solutions.
i
j

Secondly, Robertson argues that 14 Solutions d;d not defeat Robertson's
contract claims. 14 Solutions submit this argument is flawed where the trial court
refused to return any portion of the down-payment to Robertson which Robertson
was seeking to have returned with its claims, and forced Robertson to pay
1

additional moneys 1M IX Solutions after trial. It is self-evident that 14 Solutions
defeated Robertson's claims. As held and discussed above in Mountain States, 14
Solutions needed only to have prevented recovery by Plaintiff to have prevailed on
the claims under the flexible and reasonable approach, and hence is the prevailing
party.
Robertson's third argument is that the Reciprocity Statute gives the trial
court the option of awarding attorney fees required by contract because of the word
10

"may" in the Reciprocity Statute. This argument is addressed above.
Fourthly, Robertson again argues that no party prevailed, which assertion 14
Solutions has already established is false.
IV.

ALL OF ROBERTSON'S ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL
ARE FLAWED.

Robertson makes the argument on cross-appeal that the trail court erred in
finding for 14 Solutions on its unjust enrichment claim. Robertson also argues that
it should be awarded attorney fees for defending against 14 Solutions' appeal.
The Court must "afford broad discretion to the trial court in its application of
unjust enrichment law to the facts." Desert Mirah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000
UT 83, ^[9, 12 P.3d 580. Although a trial court is given broad discretion is
fashioning equitable awards, it is fundamental that, "findings of fact must show
that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the
evidence. The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached." Parduhn v. Bennett, at ^[24 (citations omitted). In the
present controversy, the findings are sufficiently detailed.
Additionally, the standard of review on this issue is not correctness, as
Robertson argues, but clear error because Robertson is attacking the factual

findings of the trial court. Nonetheless, even putting the unjust enrichment issue

1

aside arguendo, 14 Solutions has already submitted in its initial brief that trial court
found each of the factual elements necessary to support a conclusion of law that 14
Solutions prevailed on its breach on contract claim under a correctness standard.
ii

As argued above, this Court should recognize the legdl consequence of the trial
court's factual determinations, which legal consequence is that i4 solutions won its
breach of contract claim and is entitled to attorney fees.
Regardless of whether or not this Court allows the $1,800 unjust enrichment
award to 14 Solutions to stand under the equitable claim upon which the trial court
premised it, that award is ultimately irrelevant to determining that 14 Solutions is
the prevailing party on Robertson's breach of contract claim, and to entitling 14
Solutions to attorney fees. 14 Solutions defeated Robertson's attempt to have the
down-payment returned, and therefore, as established above, is 1

prevailing

party. The trial court did not grant Robertson the return of any portion of the
$3,500 down-payment Robertson was seeking in damages. It bears repeating that
the trial court instead allowed 14 Solutions to retain that $3,500 down-payment
under the contract, and awarded 14 Solutions additional moneys pursuant to the
contract under the auspices of unjust enrichment.
Robertson argues in its opposition brief that it is "being required to defend

its position on appeal" and is entitled to attorney fees, although Robertson's
position in trial is not the position it is defending on appeal. Robertson argued in
trial that the "winner" was entitled to attorney fees. Robertson takes the opposite
position now in appeal, except with respect to its request for attorney fees. Even if
14 Solutions were to lose its appeal on the attorney fees issue, that issue is
incidental to the principal damage award in trial, and determination of the principal
issue in trial, upon which Robertson is not the prevailing party, and which damage
award 14 Solutions is not challenging.
Because Robertson is not the prevailing party, Robertson is not entitled to
attorney fees unless Robertson can win a determination on appeal that it was the
prevailing party in trial, as it is attempting with its Cross-Appeal. For this Court to
rule otherwise would be to determine that that attorney fees ought to be awarded in
increments to the winner of each successive issue in litigation without regard to
whom the ultimate winner of the claims themselves might be.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's nonaward of attorney fees and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to
enter an award of attorney fees and costs against Robertson in favor of the
prevailing party, 14. 14 also requests its attorney fees and costs on appeal.
n
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